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than elsewhere. We argue that this stems from the immigration boom in Spain over this 
period. We show that the New Keynesian Phillips curve is shifted by immigration if natives’ 
and immigrants’ labor supply or bargaining power differ. Estimation of the curve for Spain 
indicates that the fall in unemployment since 1995 would have led to an annual increase in 
inflation of 2.5 percentage points if it had not been largely offset by immigration. 
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Over the period 1995-2006, Spanish unemployment has decreased by almost 15 percent-
age points, from 22% to 8%, while inﬂation has remained subdued, falling ﬁrst from
4% to 2% in the run-up to European Monetary Union (EMU) and then moving back
again to 3-4% since the 2000s. Thus, as depicted in Figure 1, there have been remark-
able changes in the position and slope of the Spanish Phillips curve (henceforth, PC),
w h i c hh a ss h i f t e di n w a r d sa n db e c o m em u c hﬂatter. These trends have been shared by
many other countries over that period. For instance, the fall in the inﬂation rate and its
volatility in Spain is very similar to those in the euro area.1 Spain is however atypical
in that the favorable inﬂation developments have coincided with a fall in unemployment
which is much larger than the average 2.5 percentage-point drop in the euro area.
The causes of the reduction in Spanish unemployment since the mid-1990s have
been analyzed to some extent in the literature (see, e.g., Bentolila and Jimeno, 2006).
However, the changes in the long-run level of inﬂation and its short-run tradeoﬀ with
unemployment remain largely unexplored. Most of the standard stories proposed to
explain the recent joint evolution of inﬂation and unemployment in other countries do
not seem very useful in the case of Spain. For instance, while structural unemployment
has clearly fallen, it is diﬃcult to identify key labor market reforms that could explain
such a large reduction and hence sustain a lower level of long-run inﬂation at current
unemployment rates. Next, a rise in the productivity growth rate, which has been
proposed to explain the improved inﬂation-unemployment tradeoﬀ in the United States
(Ball and Moﬃtt, 2001), does not ﬁt the Spanish experience either. Indeed, over the last
decade, productivity growth in Spain, if anything, has fallen, being among the lowest in
the European Union nowadays. Likewise, explanations based on the eﬀects of monetary
policy on real activity (Karanassou et al., 2002, and Karanassou and Snower, 2007)
require extreme assumptions leading to the existence of a non-vertical PC in the long
run, and in any event they do not explain why similar developments have not occurred
1T h ed e c l i n ei ni n ﬂation volatility has happened in many other economies, alongside a decline in



































Figure 1: Inﬂation and unemployment in Spain, 1980-2006
in other European countries. It has also been argued that the opening of both the trade
and the capital account lead to a ﬂattening of the PC (Razin and Loungani, 2007),
although other authors point out that if globalization increases competition and, hence,
makes wages and prices more ﬂexible, the PC ought to become steeper, not ﬂatter.2
Moreover, although trade openness has noticeably increased since the early 1990s, it
seems doubtful that it could sustain low inﬂa t i o no ni t so w n ,i nt h ef a c eo fs u c hal a r g e
reduction in unemployment. Finally, EMU could have contributed to the ﬂattening of
the PC, as low inﬂation expectations became better anchored. Still, why inﬂation did
not surge with the large reduction in unemployment is puzzling.
Recent studies on the inﬂation rate and its tradeoﬀ with unemployment in Spain
have taken three diﬀerent approaches. First, the sources of the Spanish persistent pos-
itive inﬂation diﬀerential vis-à-vis the rest of the Euro area have been analyzed within
calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. This type of studies con-
cludes that the diﬀerential could be explained either by demand shocks biased towards
2See Ball (2006). Further discussion is found in Rogoﬀ (2003) and Bean (2006).
2non-tradable goods combined with real wage rigidities (López-Salido et al., 2005) or by
ﬂuctuations in productivity growth in the tradable sector (Rabanal, 2006). Secondly,
as mentioned above, there is research on the possibility of a non-zero unemployment-
inﬂation tradeoﬀ in the long-run Spanish PC, which focuses on the interaction between
money growth and nominal frictions by estimating reduced form inﬂation equations
(Karanassou et al., 2002). Lastly, and closer to our wor k ,G a l ía n dL ó p e z - S a l i d o( 2 0 0 1 )
estimate a New Keynesian PC (NKPC) for the Spanish economy during the disinﬂation
period (1980-1998). They show that it ﬁts the data quite well, though with a relatively
high degree of inﬂation persistence, and that the price of imported intermediate goods
and labor market frictions are the key factors driving the dynamics of marginal costs,
which determine inﬂation jointly with inﬂation expectations.
None of these studies, however, addresses a recent fundamental change aﬀecting the
Spanish labor market, namely the immigration boom that has taken place since the
mid-1990s. The proportions of foreigners in the Spanish population and labor force were
both around 1% in 1995, while in 2006 they reached around 10% and 14%, respectively.
As we will discuss later, there have been very large waves of immigrants, specially since
2000, coming mainly from Latin America, North Africa, and Eastern Europe.
In this paper we aim at ﬁlling this gap by analyzing the consequences of immigration
for the joint behavior of unemployment and inﬂation. So far this topic has drawn little
attention in the literature on the PC. To our knowledge, only two recent papers tackle
it directly. On the one hand, Razin and Binyamini (2007) show that immigration and
outmigration raise the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand inducing a ﬂat-
ter PC. On the other hand, Engler (2007) ﬁnds a similar result, albeit this time via
temporary outmigration of natives. Our approach diﬀers from theirs in that we stress
other labor-market channels through which immigration can aﬀect inﬂation determina-
tion. To the extent that wages are diﬀerently determined for natives and immigrants
—for instance if immigrants are less well represented by labor unions than natives— or
insofar as the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is diﬀerent
for each group —immigrants tend to be more mobile and more willing to take low-paid
jobs than natives— expected marginal costs can fall as immigration increases. Through
3these eﬀects, we embed immigration into an otherwise standard NKPC with real wage
sluggishness, as proposed recently by Blanchard and Galí (2007). In this way, we derive
microfounded inﬂation equations that are estimated and used to account for the impact
of the immigration boom on the recent evolution of the Spanish PC.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review in more detail
several hypotheses used in the literature to explain the changes in the PC in most major
economies, and discuss whether they ﬁt the evidence for Spain. In Section 3 we document
the changes in the Spanish labor market since the mid-1990s, focusing on immigration.
In Section 4 we derive an NKPC when the labor market is composed of two worker types,
namely immigrants and natives. In Section 5 we discuss the results from estimating the
NKPC with immigration for Spain since the early 1980s. Section 6 contains evidence
about how our proposed NKPC performs at the industry level, given that immigration
is highly concentrated on some industries. Section 7 concludes. Two Appendices gather
some analytical derivations and a description of the data.
2T h e j o i n t f a l l o f i n ﬂation and unemployment
The recent evolution of inﬂation and unemployment in Spain brings out three stylized
features: a reduction in inﬂationary expectations, a large fall in the structural unem-
ployment rate or NAIRU, and a ﬂatter PC. While the fall in inﬂationary expectations is
clearly due to the change in the monetary policy regime in the late 1990s brought forth
by EMU, the factors behind the other two changes are less evident.
According to some estimates, the NAIRU has fallen from about 15% in 1996 to 9% in
2006 (Izquierdo and Regil, 2006). This is remarkable, as structural policy indicators do
not exhibit important changes. For instance, the “reform intensity indicator” of Brandt
et al. (2005) for 1994-2004 ranks Spain in the 24th position out of 30 OECD countries.
In fact, considering all institutions usually regarded as relevant in explaining structural
unemployment —tax wedge, employment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment
beneﬁts, wage setting and industrial relations, working-time ﬂexibility, incentives for la-
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate and productivity growth (right scale), 1980-2004
changes in the strictness of EPL for permanent labor contracts (which has been signiﬁ-
cantly relaxed between 1994 and 2003 according to the OECD —probably a too benign
judgment of a labor reform in 1997) and in product market regulation (an improvement
shared by most other OECD countries).3
As for the unemployment-inﬂation tradeoﬀ, it has been argued that higher produc-
tivity growth could reduce the level of inﬂation at given wages. The basic idea is that
misalignment between wage aspirations and productivity shift the PC. This explanation
has been used to rationalize the inward shift of the PC in the United States since 1995
(Ball and Moﬃtt, 2001). However, since the mid-1990s, when unemployment began to
fall in Spain, the productivity growth rate has also fallen signiﬁcantly. As seen in Fig-
ure 2, both labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) showed noticeable
deceleration, with the former being barely positive and the latter being even negative
since the beginning of the 2000s.4
3On labor market reforms in Spain see Dolado et al. (2002) and Bentolila and Jimeno (2006).
4Data on productivity are from the EU KLEMS Database, March 2007, www.euklems.net.
5Lastly, another potential factor driving the fall in inﬂation is globalization, which
operates through two basic mechanisms: increasing trade integration and global compe-
tition, and changes in import prices (International Monetary Fund, 2006). As for trade
integration, the degree of openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP) has indeed
increased, but along a long-term trend. Thus, it is far from being a new phenomenon
although it can be argued that its trend tilts up since 1992, coinciding with the onset of
a disinﬂation episode (see Figure 3). Yet, in our view, the evolution of inﬂation during
1992-1998 is mostly determined, as in many other European countries, by the nominal
convergence process required to join EMU. Secondly, Figure 4 shows that, although the
growth rate of nominal imported input prices decelerated up to the early 1990s, with
inﬂation following suit, since then it has ﬂuctuated around a constant mean. This in-
dicates a decoupling from inﬂa t i o n— w h i c hk e e p sd e c l i n i n gu n t i l1 9 9 8a n dt h e ng o e su p
again. In our empirical model we will include imported input inﬂation as a determinant
of marginal costs and thus of inﬂation. In the next section we document another dimen-
sion of globalization, widely understood, which has changed more dramatically in Spain,
namely immigration.
3 The immigration boom
In 1991 there were only about 350.000 foreigners living in Spain, but by 2006 the ﬁgure
had risen to about 4.1 million, i.e. it went from 1% to 9.3% of total population. The
average annual immigrant ﬂow during 2000-2006 was around 485.000 persons, one of the
largest among developed countries (cfr. 1 and 1.2 millions, respectively, in the European
Union and the United States). This is quite a unique experience. Using comparable
data from Eurostat, the Spanish yearly net immigration rate over 2000-2004 is equal
to 1.3%. No other large or middle-sized European country has sustained such a large
inﬂow over a 5-year period since 1965 (when data start); the closest ﬁgures are 0.9% in
Ireland over the same period and 1% in Portugal over 1975-1979.5
The geographical distribution of immigrants is roughly 24% from the European Union
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Figure 4: Inﬂation and the growth rate of imported input prices (right scale), 1980-2006
7and 76% from the rest of the world (34% from South America, 20% from Africa, 13%
from Eastern Europe, 5% from Asia, and 4% from other areas).6 Immigrants are over-
represented, vis-à-vis natives, in agriculture (7.4% vs. 5.6% in 2000-2006) and construc-
tion (17.8% vs. 11.5%), and under-represented in industry and services (though they
show high shares in some service industries, like home services, and hotels and catering).
For the most representative group of immigrants over the period 1996-2006, namely those
aged 20-45 years old from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, Fernández and
Ortega (2007) report that immigrants have slightly less schooling than natives (10.08
vs. 10.35 years, although those from Africa show a signiﬁcantly lower ﬁgure, 7.5 years).
Nevertheless, 39% of them take jobs for which they are overqualiﬁed, vis-à-vis 17% of
natives.7
As seen in Figure 5, immigration ﬂows started to increase around 1996 and acceler-
ated from 2000. Why did it happen precisely at those periods? Mostly due to prosperity.
The latest Spanish economic boom began in the second half of 1995. Then, in the 2000s,
Spain sustained high growth while many other European countries had low growth or
stagnation. Since 1995 Spanish GDP growth has surpassed the euro area average by
1.3% per year while the diﬀerential in Spanish employment growth has been a stag-
gering 2.9%, implying that Spain has created 48% of all new net jobs in the euro area
(OECD Economic Outlook database, June 2007). More speciﬁcally, the large fall in real
interest rates following the adoption of the euro favored industries with long and large
investments, like construction, which are intensive in unskilled labor. The progressive
rise in female labor force participation8 also increased the demand for household ser-
vices which migrants were ready to provide at low wages. Additionally, although there
has not been an active policy geared towards attracting immigrants, several amnesties
have granted legal residence to illegal immigrants (1996, 2000/2001, and 2005). These
forces, alongside the crises in several Latin American countries in the early 2000s and
6For a more detailed account of the stylised facts of immigration in Spain see Carrasco et al. (2007),
and Dolado and Vázquez (2007).
7A worker is considered to be overeducated when his/her level of education is above the mean plus
one standard deviation in his/her occupational category.
8For example, the participation rate of native females aged 24 to 54 years old rose from 57.5% in
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Figure 5: Inﬂation and the fraction of immigrants in the labor force, 1980-2006
the long-standing decline in Africa, respectively provided strong pull and push eﬀects
on immigration. Lastly, growing network eﬀects strengthened the initial forces.
It is also worth stressing that in the 2000s the unemployment rate of immigrants has
diverged from the national average, remaining well above that of natives (see Figure 6).
The main reason for this phenomenon is the sheer size of the inﬂows. Fernández and
Ortega (2007) examine the labor market assimilation of immigrant workers in Spain,
concluding that on average they tend to achieve similar unemployment rates as natives
about ﬁve years after arrival. Thus, a continuous yearly inﬂux of more than 1% of
the labor force was bound to mechanically increase the average unemployment rate of
immigrants. Moreover, even after their assimilation period, immigrants tend to be over-
represented in temporary jobs, and in construction and certain service industries, all of
which are associated with high turnover rates.9 This means that, even if their labor
9Fernández and Ortega (2007) report that over 1996-2006 the proportion of employed immigrants
with temporary jobs was 60.7% (versus 33.6% for natives). They also show that immigrants have
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Figure 6: Unemployment rates of natives and immigrans, 1987-2006
supply elasticity is lower than that of natives (as assumed in Section 4 below), we would
expect migrants to experience higher frictional unemployment than natives.
Natives are also likely to have lower bargaining power vis-à-vis employers than na-
tives. Apart from any assimilation handicaps (e.g. regarding command of the language),
they most often work in industries with a lower coverage of collective wage bargaining.10
We estimate that their coverage rate is about 8 points lower than the rate for natives.
Alternatively, the coeﬃcient of correlation across industries between the coverage rate
and the immigrant share of employees is equal to -0.11.
As a rough ﬁrst-pass indication of the potential impact of immigration on the Spanish
labor market, Figure 7 shows a negative correlation between real wage growth and the
diﬀerential between the unemployment rate of immigrants and the overall unemployment
rate. It is noticeable that real wage growth turns negative precisely during the latter
period, when the unemployment rate gap accelerates.
10The degree of unionization is not available and, moreover, it does not mean much in the Spanish
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Figure 7: Real wage growth and relative immigrant unemployment rate, 1987-2006
There is a long literature on the eﬀects of immigration on the receiving country’s
labor market. Most studies analyze the impact on employment rates and wages of native
workers.11 Much less attention has been paid to immigration in the macroeconomic
analysis of the labor market and, speciﬁcally, to the impact of immigration on the
NAIRU and the unemployment-inﬂation tradeoﬀ. This neglect is probably due to the
long-run neutrality of labor supply in standard macroeconomic models of unemployment.
However, assuming some diﬀerences between immigrants and natives, there are several
channels through which immigration may aﬀect labor market outcomes. First, there is an
ongoing debate on whether immigrant and native workers are complements (Ottaviano
and Peri, 2006) or substitutes (Borjas, 2003) in production. Secondly, the employment
patterns of immigrants and, in particular, their industry composition and geographical
mobility suggest that they have diﬀerent preferences regarding consumption and leisure
than natives. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Razin and Binyamini (2007) show that
11See Card (2001) for the US, Carrasco et al. (2007) for Spain, and Borjas (1999) for a survey.
11immigration alters the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand, inducing a ﬂatter
PC. Lastly, it is also likely that immigrants have a lower bargaining power than natives in
noncompetitive labor markets. Hence, a rise in the immigration ﬂow increases the labor
intensity of production, changes the elasticity of labor supply, and decreases the markup
of wages over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In the
next section, we explicitly model how these three eﬀects interact to change the PC.
4 An NKPC accounting for immigration
In this section we extend the standard analysis of the NKPC to take into account het-
erogeneity across two types of workers with diﬀerent characteristics, namely immigrants
and natives. We ﬁrst present the setup of the model and then solve for equilibrium with
real wage rigidity and monopoly power.
4.1 Model setup
As is standard in the literature on the NKPC, we start by assuming an economy with a
continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated product
(Q) and facing an isoelastic demand with price elasticity  >1. The production function
is constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas with two inputs, labor (N)a n dr a w
materials (M). For simplicity, as in Blanchard and Galí (2007) (hereafter BG), we ignore
capital in the following analysis, so that Q should be interpreted stricto sensu as ﬁnal
output net of capital compensation. The main novelty here with respect to most models
in this literature is the assumption that the labor input consists of two components, to
be interpreted as native (N1)a n di m m i g r a n tw o r k e r s( N2). Since both types of workers
are bound to be imperfect substitutes, we aggregate them into the single labor-input












2t ,( 2 )
12so that σ =( 1− ρ)−1 is the elasticity of substitution between native and immigrant
workers.12
By means of the envelope theorem, marginal costs plus the markup can be expressed
as a function of the labor index as follows (hereafter lowercase letters denote logs of
variables in levels):
mcQ + µ
p = ω − (q − n) − ln(1 − α)+µ
p, (3)
where ω is the average real wage (i.e. the log of the nominal wage, w,m i n u st h el o g
of the gross output deﬂator, pQ), mcQ i st h er e a lm a r g i n a lc o s to fp r o d u c i n gQ,a n dµp
(= log( /  − 1)) is a constant price markup.
We assume that immigrants and native workers are not only diﬀerent in production,
but also in their marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS),
as given by the following functions, for i =1 ,2,






where Ci is composite consumption (with elasticity of substitution equal to  )a n dξ
is a preference parameter. Hence, the marginal rate of substitution, mrs, between
consumption and labor is given by
mrsi = ci + φini + ξ. (4)
Following the discussion in Section 3, it is assumed that the slopes of the labor
supply curves of immigrant and native workers in the wage-employment space diﬀer.
In particular, we proceed in the sequel as if φ2 >φ 1.S i n c e t h e φi are the inverses of
the respective Frisch elasticities of labor supply, this means that the labor supply of
immigrants is taken to be less elastic than that of native workers.13 This assumption,
12Notice that the assumption of constant returns to scale in (1) can be relaxed to short-run decreasing
returns (αm+ αn < 1), considering that we ignore capital. BG discuss this case and show that the
speciﬁcation of the NKPC in this case only diﬀers from that derived below in (27), with αm+ αn =1 ,b y
having the diﬀerenced unemployment rate as an additional regressor. This is checked in the empirical
estimation below.
13This implies that, in the presence of a negative demand shock leading to a positive unemployment
gap (i.e. u2 −u>0), immigrants are more ready to reduce their wages than natives in order to remain
employed. By the same token, if a positive demand shock takes place, immigrants’ wages would increase
by a larger amount, given our linearity assumption. In order to check whether the labour supply curve
of immigrant workers is concave, we will allow for a quadratic term in their relative unemployment
when estimating the NKPC equation (27) derived below.
13however, can be tested later in the empirical section.
Then, taking a log-approximation of equation (2) around the steady-state, we have
that average employment and wages (in deviations from steady state) are given by (see
Appendix A.1 for a derivation)
n = λn1 +( 1− λ)n2
ω = λω1 +( 1− λ)ω2, (5)
with λ ' δ1(N1
N )ρ =1− δ2(IR)ρ,w h e r eIR (= N2/N) denotes the steady-state immi-
gration rate deﬁned in terms of employment.
The expressions in (5) would hold exactly if we had assumed a Cobb-Douglas labor
aggregator in equation (2), which is the limit case of the CES function when σ tends to
1.I nt h a tc a s e ,λ and 1 − λ could be interpreted as the distribution parameters δ1 and
δ2, respectively. However, the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation poses at least two problems.
First, it implies that production cannot be carried out without immigrants, which does
not sit well with the very low fraction of employment represented by immigrants at
the beginning of our sample period (0.3%). And secondly, the immigration rate has
increased steadily over time, which renders its steady-state value IR a not well-deﬁned
concept. We could tackle this issue by endogeneizing IR in terms of a Harris-Todaro
non-arbitrage wage condition, so that IR would be implicitly deﬁned by the equality
of expected wages of immigrants in the countries of origin and destination (see Razin
and Binyamini, 2007). However, this route is not feasible, since at the estimation stage
we would need long time series of immigrants’ wages in all origin countries, which are
unavailable. Another possibililty would be to adopt the standard approach advocated
by Galí and Gertler (1999) of using the labor income share to capture the evolution of
t h er e a lm a r g i n a lc o s t . G i v e no u rC E Ss p e c i ﬁcation in (2), this would imply that the
real marginal cost would be equal to a linear combination of the labor income share
and the relative wage of native and immigrant workers.14 Unfortunately, this route is
14This is akin to the conventional procedure developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) when
they discuss the case of a CES production function, instead of (1), with labor and raw materials as
inputs. They show that, besides the labor share, the other determinant of real marginal cost is the
relative price of the two inputs.
14again not feasible, since there is only data on aggregate wages in Spain but not on wages
according to workers’ nationality.
Given these caveats, we need to account for time variation in the weighting factors
used to aggregate employment and wages of the two types of workers in (5). To do
so, we take a shortcut by implementing a similar approximation to the one before,
but this time around the observed values of the ratio N2/N during our sample, rather
than around its steady-state value, N2/N.This yields a time-varying parameter given by
λ(IR)=1 −δ2(IR)ρ,w h e r eIRis the observed immigration rate in terms of employment.
Next, we approximate λ(IR) (hereafter, λ for short) by a quadratic function in terms of
the (logged) employment-based immigration rate ir (= n2 −n), which arises from using
a second-order Taylor approximation of λ around the Cobb-Douglas case of ρ =0 .15 In
this way, the time variation in λ around λ is captured by changes in the variable ir over
the sample period. As shown in Appendix A.2, this Taylor expansion takes the form





i.e., an expression which will give rise to interaction terms between one of the explanatory
v a r i a b l e sa n dt h et w ot e r m si nir when we reach the ﬁnal speciﬁcation of the NKPC
(see Section 4.4 below). Hence, in the sequel, we will proceed by replacing (5) with the
alternative approximations
n = λn1 +( 1− λ)n2
ω = λω1 +( 1− λ)ω2, (7)
with λ deﬁn e da si n( 6 ) .
4.1.1 Sluggish wages and markups
As in BG, we consider the case where real wages respond sluggishly to labor market
conditions, due to some (unmodeled) imperfection in the labor market. Further, it is
a s s u m e dt h a tt h e r ea r eg r o s sw a g em a r k u p s( p o ssibly time varying), denoted (in logs) by
µω
i (i =1 ,2). The markups reﬂect factors like any monopoly power held by workers in
15This resembles the procedure advocated by Kmenta (1967) to estimate CES production functions.
15the labor market or distorsionary taxes on labor income, which can diﬀer across worker
types. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that real wages of both native and immigrant workers
follow a partial adjustment model of the form (again for i =1 ,2):
ωi = γωi,−1 +( 1− γ)(mrsi + µ
ω
i ). (8)
Thus, replacing (4) in (8) yields
ωi = γωi,−1 +( 1− γ)(ci + φini + ξ + µ
ω
i ), (9)
where γ ∈ [0,1) is the sluggishness parameter.16 In order to compute the average wage
ω, using (7), it is useful to notice the following result regarding the weighted sum of the
ni terms appearing in the aggregation of the two wages in (9),
λφ1n1 +( 1− λ)φ2n2 = ψn+ φ21ir, (10)
where ψ = λφ1 +( 1− λ)φ2, i.e. the average of the inverse labor supply elasticities,
and φ21 =( 1− λ)(φ2 − φ1) > 0. Then, denoting the lag operator by L and noting








1−γL , the combination of (4) and (9), yields the average wage
ω = q + ψn+ φ21ir + ξ + µ
ω −
γ∆(q + ψn+ φ21ir + ξ + µω)
1 − γL
, (11)
where, in our economy with just consumption goods, average consumption is equal to
output, that is, q = λc1 +( 1− λ)c2,a n dµω = λµω
1 +( 1− λ)µω
2 is the average markup.
From (1), the MRS between labor and raw materials implies that labor productivity
behaves as




16We also tried an alternative speciﬁcation where the persistence parameters diﬀer across workers
and their preferences are identical, i.e.,
ωi = γiωi,−1 +( 1− γi)(mrs + µω); i =1 ,2.
When using the aggregation procedure in (6), this yields the following model for wages
ω − (γ1 + γ2)ω−1 + γ1γ2ω−2 =( 1 − γ1)(1 − γ2)(mrs + µω)+
[λ(γ2 − γ1)+γ1(1 − γ2)]∆(mrs + µω).
This speciﬁcation leads to more complicated dynamics in the evolution of the real marginal cost and in
the NKPC, which where rejected by our data. Hence, we opted for the model described in the text.
16where sQ is the real price of raw materials (i.e., the log of its nominal price, pm, minus
pQ). Thereby, substituting this expression into (11), yields an equation describing the
dynamic evolution of real wages from the workers’ side:












The next step is to derive the ﬁrst-best price equilibrium in this economy. This corre-
sponds to the case where prices and wages are ﬂexible (γ =0 ), and labor and goods
markets are perfectly competitive, i.e. µω = µp =0 .I ns u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u m ,f r o mt h e
ﬁrms’ side, the real aggregate wage would be equal to the marginal product of labor
(mpn), that is, ω = mpn = q −n+ln(1−α). Similarly, from the workers’ side, the real
wage would be equal to the marginal rate of substitution, that is, ω = q+ψn+φ21ir+ξ.
Therefore, equating both expressions and labeling the ﬁrst-best equilibrium value of a
generic variable x by xF, we have that the employment of natives and immigrants in
this equilibrium satisfy the following condition
(1 + ψ) n
F + φ21ir
F =l n ( 1− α) − ξ. (13)
4.3 Equilibrium with real wage rigidities and monopoly power
Going back to our economy with labor market frictions and monopolistic power in the
goods and labor markets, substitution of (13) into (12) yields the evolution of the wage-
setting from the workers’ side,
ω = Γω−1 +
1 − Γ
1 − α
[αlnα +( 1− α)ln(1− α) − αsQ + µ
ω +( 1+ψ)e n + φ21e ir], (14)
where e n (= n − nF)a n de ir (= ir − ir
F) are the deviations of n and ir from their
corresponding ﬁrst-best equilibrium values.
From the ﬁrms’ side we have that mcQ+µp = ω−mpn+µp. Then, inserting (14) into
this expression and using (1) yields the following equation describing the corresponding
17dynamic evolution of the real marginal cost of gross output
(1−ΓL)(mcQ+µ
p)=





where e q = q − qF.
4.4 Unemployment and immigration in the marginal cost
In order to express (15) in terms of observables, namely the unemployment (u)a n d
immigration rates, we follow BG in assuming that the (logged) labor supplies ( i)a n d
the relative labor supply of immigrants vis-à-vis natives (irl =  2 −  1) are implicitly
deﬁned by:
ω = q + ψ + φ21irl + ξ + µ
ω. (16)
That is,   and irl measure the notional quantities of labor that native and immigrant
workers would like to supply given their current wage, marginal utility of income, and
steady-state wage markup, µω. Hence, from the ﬁrms’ side, substitution of (16) into (3),
yields
mcQ + µ
p =( 1+ψ)  − (  − n)+ξ − ln(1 − α)+φ21irl + µ
ω + µ
p. (17)
Next, making use of the standard approximation u '   − n, noticing that irl =
(irl − ir
F)+ir
F, and recalling the ﬁrst-best equilibrium condition (13), implies that









Hence, solving for (1+ψ)e q/(1−α) in (18) and replacing it in (15), yields the following





[ψu+ φ21(u2 − u) − e µ
ω]+α∆sQ, (19)
where e µ
w = µω −µω, and use has been made of the result that irl−ir =(  2− )−(n2−
n) ' u2 − u, i.e. the diﬀerence between the unemployment rate of immigrants and the
aggregate unemployment rate.
184.4.1 Interaction terms with immigration
T h en e x ts t e pi st on o t i c et h a tp a r a m e t e r sψ and φ21 depend on the time-varying weight
λ, derived in (6). Thus we need to express equation (19) in terms of constant parameters.
T od os o ,i ti su s e f u lt on o t i c et h a t ,s i n c eψ = φ1+(1−λ)(φ2−φ1)=φ1+φ21, the linear
combination of unemployment rates given by ψu+φ21(u2 −u) in (19), can be rewritten
as follows (see Appendix A.2)





where ψ = φ1+φ21 and φ21 =( 1−λ)(φ2−φ1),w i t hλ interpreted as in (5). Substitution
of (20) into (19) yields an alternative speciﬁcation of (19) in terms of constant rather












Finally, deviations of the wage markup from its steady-state value, i.e. e µ
w 6=0 ,
would also alter the marginal cost (see Galí et al., 2001, for a discussion). As explained
in Appendix A.3, in a right-to-manage model of wage determination by ﬁrms and unions,
among other alternatives, a labor supply shift due to immigration can be captured by a
rise in u2 − u —since it is likely that immigrants will take longer than natives in ﬁnding
a job— which, in turn, could be interpreted as implying a fall in e µ
w.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,w e
assume a linear relationship of the form e µ










Notice that the term in u2−u plus the two interaction terms in u2 and ir are the new
variables that our model adds to the speciﬁcation proposed by BG in a similar model
where immigration is ignored. The intuition behind these eﬀects is as follows. First,
insofar as the unemployment rate of immigrants is higher than the unemployment rate of
natives, this will induce a reduction in the marginal cost both via lower wages —because
immigrants have a less elastic labor supply than natives—17 and through a reduction
17Think of a negative labor demand shift: wages fall more the less elastic is labor supply. Here the
shift is one that reduces immigrants’ employment more than natives’.
19in the wage markup set by unions. Further, in our model the interaction terms give
rise to the convenient property that these eﬀects of the u2 − u gap depend on the size
of the immigration rate in the economy: the higher is the immigration rate the larger
will be the reduction in inﬂation brought about by the unemployment rate diﬀerential.
Alternatively, these eﬀects on the marginal cost will more sizeable in economies with
large immigration rates than in those with low immigration.
4.4.2 Gross output and GDP deﬂators
B e f o r et u r n i n gt ot h eﬁnal speciﬁcation of NKPC equation, a ﬁnal issue to be addressed
is that, according to our interpretation of Q in (1), equation (22) yields the determinants
of the marginal cost of producing gross output, rather than value added (GDP). Since a
time series of the gross output deﬂator, pQ, is not available for Spain (only nominal gross
output at current prices is available), we need to reinterpret (22) in terms of the GDP
deﬂator, p, which is the series we will use in the empirical section below to construct
the inﬂation rate in the NKPC. The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function
in (1) implies separability between raw materials and the labor input used to produce
GDP. Hence, it follows that ∆(mcQ +µp)=∆(mc +µp),w h e r emc is the real marginal
cost of producing GDP. Consequently, the only variable in the right-hand-side of (22)
that needs to be changed is the real price of raw materials, sQ,w h i c hw a sd e ﬂated by
pQ. To replace pQ by p in this real price, we make use of the fact the former price index
is implicitly deﬁned by pQ =( 1− χ)p + χpm or pQ = p + χsm,w h e r es = pm − p and χ
is the share of the value of imports in nominal gross output, as reported in the national
accounts. Hence, the changes in sQ and s are related by
∆sQ = ∆s − (∆pQ − ∆p)=∆s − χ(∆pm − ∆p)=( 1− χ)∆s. (23)











Notice that there is a diﬀerence between the shares of raw materials α and χ.A s
argued above, we have that χ = PmM/PQQ, whereas, denoting capital compensation
20by rK, α = PmM/(PQQ − rK), since capital has been ignored as an input of Q in (1).
Therefore, χ<α . In any case, the coeﬃcient on ∆s in the above equation is positive
since α(1 − χ) > 0.
An important feature of (23) is that the marginal cost of producing GDP has a unit
root as long as 0 < Γ < 1, i.e. 0 <γ<1. As will be shown below, this implies that the
NKPC has the appealing property that inﬂa t i o ni si nt h el o n gr u ni n d e p e n d e n to fr e a l
factors, which only inﬂuence the change in inﬂation. As explained in Appendix A.4, the
insight behind this property is the presence of real rigidities, either in wages (as in the
present model) or in the price-setting rule.
4.5 Alternative speciﬁcations of the NKPC
Having derived the evolution of the real marginal cost, the last step is to obtain an
NKPC linking it to inﬂation. For that, we use the two well-known alternatives proposed
by Galí and Gertler (1999): the forward-looking model (FNPC) and the hybrid (i.e., a
combination of forward and backward-looking price-setters) model (HNPC). These two
speciﬁcations are given (introducing time subscripts), respectively by













where πt (≡ pt−pt−1) is the inﬂation rate in period t, Etπt+1 is the (rational) expectation
of inﬂation in t+1conditional on all information available up to t, κf =( 1 −βθ)(1−θ)/θ,
κh =( 1− ς)(1 − βθ)(1 − θ),a n dτ = θ + ς[1 − θ(1 − β)]. In these expressions, β is the
discount rate, 1−θ is the probability that ﬁrms are allowed to optimally reset prices in
period t according to Calvo’s (1983) model, and ς is the proportion of ﬁrms which use
the simple backward-looking rule of thumb proposed by Galí and Gertler (1999).18
Substituting (22) into (25) and (26) yields the two speciﬁcations of the NKPC with
immigration that we estimate below. The forward-looking PC with immigration (FN-
18As discussed in Appendix A.4 a similar NKPC can be derived using Rotemberg’s (1982) quadratic





















1 = β/(1 + β) and ψ
f
2 =1 /(1 + β). Hence, everything else equal, (27) estab-
lishes a tradeoﬀ between the change in inﬂation, ∆π, and the unemployment rate, u.
It is worth noticing that in this speciﬁcation both the intercept and the slope (with
respect to ut) of the standard PC are shifted by the presence of immigrants. In eﬀect,
in the absence of immigration (i.e. φ21 = ν =0 , λ =1 ,a n dir =0 ), the slope
of the PC in the (∆π,u) plane will be −
κf(1−Γ)
Γ(1+β) φ1,s i n c eψ = φ1 when φ21 =0 ,









Γ(1+β) (φ1 − ν) so that the PC is ﬂatter than







u2t + ρφ21u2tirt +
ρ2
2 φ21u2tirt
2]. Notice that both changes are there-
fore in line with the evolution of the Spanish PC during the last decade or so, as shown
in Figure 1.






















1 = βθ/(τ+βθ), ψ
h
2 =( τ+ς)/(τ+βθ),a n dψ
h







1, so that, as before, the NKPC is vertical in the long run.
Inspection of (27) shows that this speciﬁcation leads to the presence of forward and
backward components of inﬂa t i o ni nt h eN K P Cw i t h o u th a v i n gt or e l yo nt h ee x i s t e n c eo f
ﬁrms which use a simple backward-looking rule of thumb to set prices. By contrast, when
this type of ﬁr m si sc o n s i d e r e di n( 2 8 ) ,t h eb a c k w a r dc o m p o n e n to fi n ﬂation has two lags,
the ﬁrst one with a positive coeﬃcient and the second one with a negative coeﬃcient.
These implications will be used to discriminate between the two speciﬁcations of the
NKPC.
22Given the long-run neutrality property, we can deﬁne the concept of fundamental
change of inﬂation, ∆π∗
t, along the lines of Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí et al.
(2001), to then integrate forwards this variable in order to calculate the fundamental
level of inﬂation, π∗
t. In what follows we illustrate this procedure with the FNPCI
speciﬁcation, since the approach for the HNPCI is similar but more cumbersome. First,







jEt{b xt+j | zt}, (29)
where in our empirical application, zt =[ b xt,b xt−1,b xt−2,πt,πt−1,πt−2] and
b xt = −
(1 − Γ)κf
(1 + β)Γ










Next, we construct b xt using the coeﬃcients in our estimated FNPCI and, to compute
forecasts of its future values, we run a second-order vector autoregression of the bivariate
system formed by ∆πt and b xt.L e t t i n gA denote the companion matrix of the VAR(1)
representation of zt,w eh a v et h a tEt{b xt+j | zt} = e0
1Ajzt,w h e r ee1 is a vector with 1 in







using the standard result that Σ∞
j=0β
jAj =( I − βA)−1 for a matrix A with eigenvalues
less that unity.
5 Empirical results
In this section we present our estimates of the model. We estimate ﬁrst the forward-
looking speciﬁcation in equation (27):
Et{[πt −α1πt+1 −α2πt−1 −α3ut −α4(u2t −ut)−α5u2tirt −α6u2tir
2
t −α7∆st] Zt} (31)
by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), using a set of instruments, Zt,c o n -
sisting of a constant, four lags of the inﬂation rate (πt), the relative unemployment rate
23of immigrants (u2t − ut), the log share of immigrants in employment (irt), the inﬂation
rate of imported inputs (∆st) —which proxies for the total intermediate input prices that
appear in the model—, and the labor income share, plus two lags of cyclical output (with
the trend estimated with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter using a parameter of 1,600) and of
an index of the degree of globalization of the Spanish economy.19 Detailed deﬁnitions
of all variables appear in Appendix B. The data start in 1980:1 but given the lead and
lags involved, our eﬀective estimation period is 1982:1-2006:3. There is no data on the
split of the labor force between natives and immigrants before 1987:2, which forces us to
assume that they had the same unemployment rate through that date. However, this is
not an important limitation since during that period immigration only represented 0.3%
of the labor force on average.
Column (1) in Table 1 presents the estimated coeﬃcients in the unrestricted speciﬁ-
cation of equation (27). All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant and have the expected
signs. In particular, the relative immigrant unemployment rate and the interactions of
the immigrants’ unemployment rate with their (logged) share in employment and its
square all have negative eﬀects on inﬂation, as predicted by the model. In other words,
the negative signs on these estimated coeﬃcients indicate that our claim that immigrants
have a lower labor supply elastiticy than natives (φ21 > 0) is strongly supported by the
data. The unrestricted value of the discount rate β implied by the coeﬃcient on lagged
inﬂation is 0.972, which is higher and more realistic than those found in the literature.
For instance, Galí et al. (2003) ﬁnd values between 0.84 and 0.92 for the euro area, and
Galí and López-Salido (2001) between 0.75 and 0.85 for Spain over the period 1990-1998.
To check whether this model is appropriate, we perform several tests of our proposed
speciﬁcation in (27) against the most relevant modelling alternatives that were discussed
before, namely: (i) constant vs. decreasing returns to scale in (1) (see footnote 11), (ii)
a linear vs. a concave shape of immigrant workers’ labor supply (see footnote 12), and
(iii) the unemployment rate gap against the labor force diﬀerential as the determinant
of the wage markup (see Appendix A.3). As regards (i), following BG (Appendix 3),
19The higher the degree of globalization, the higher should be the immigrant ﬂow, e.g. attracted by
foreign investment.
24we included the ﬁrst diﬀerences of ut and u2t − ut as additional regressors in (27) and
tested for the joint signiﬁcance of their coeﬃcients; this yielded a p-value of 0.132 in the
corresponding χ2(2) test, so that we are not able to reject the null of constant returns
to scale. With regard to (ii), a quadratic term in u2t−ut was added; again its estimated
coeﬃcient was not statistically signiﬁcant (t-ratio=1.35).20 Finally, regarding (iii), we
added the relative labor force,  2t− t, to the list of regressors, obtaing once more a non-
signiﬁcant eﬀect (t-ratio=1.13). In view of these results, we keep (27) as our preferred
unrestricted model, which we use for testing the remaining restrictions implied by the
underlying structural parameters.
In Column (1), the sum of the coeﬃcients on future and lagged inﬂation is very close
to unity, as implied by the model. A Wald test of this null hypothesis yields a p-value of
0 . 2 2 .T h u sw ei m p o s et h i sr e s t r i c t i o nt og a i ne ﬃciency, with a value for the coeﬃcient
on lagged inﬂation of 0.490, implying a value for β of 0.961. Column (2) shows the
restricted estimates, which are very similar to those in Column (1). This set of results
allows us to account for the ﬂattening of the standard PC (i.e. the slope of inﬂation
vis-à-vis unemployment) by the presence of the new term in the relative unemployment
rate of immigrants. The slope falls from -0.112 to -0.032, so that the PC becomes
signiﬁcantly ﬂatter. We also saw in Figure 1 that there were shifts in the intercept of
the PC. If we take the stable PC traced for the period before the rise in immigration that
is apparent in the graph, i.e. from 1990:1 to 1994:1, and compare its intercept to that
of the subsequent stable locus, from say 1998:4 to 2006:4, we ﬁnd that it shifts by 0.44
percentage points, due to the introduction of the three immigrantion-related variables.21
20As pointed out earlier, immigrant workers in Spain tend to achieve similar unemployment rates as
natives ﬁve years after arrival. Thus, lack of concavity in the relative unemployment may mean higher
inﬂation pressure in the future. However, as also mentioned, even after their assimilation period, immi-
grants tend to be over-represented in temporary and low-skilled jobs, for which they are overqualiﬁed.
This may reduce inﬂationary pressure since the real unit labor costs associated to these jobs are lower.
21Computed as the diﬀerence across averages over those two periods of the magnitude: b α4u2t +
b α5u2tirt + b α6u2tir2
t.
25Table 1. Forward-Looking and Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curves for Spain




Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio
Future inﬂation rate 0.493 (7.96) 0.490 (11.34) 0.615 (6.85)
Lagged inﬂation rate 0.536 (11.35) 0.510 (11.34) 0.354 (4.35)
Twice-lagged inﬂation 0.119 (2.41)
Unemployment rate rate -0.116 (3.38) -0.112 (3.49) -0.109 (2.31)
Rel. immigrant unemployment r. -0.100 (4.06) -0.080 (3.19) -0.145 (4.52)
I m m i g r a n tu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e ×
Immigration rate -0.039 (3.52) -0.031 (2.77) -0.049 (3.09)
I m m i g r a n tu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e ×
Immigration rate squared -0.005 (3.57) -0.003 (2.66) -0.008 (3.29)
∆Real imported input prices 0.004 (2.19) 0.005 (2.77) 0.005 (1.99)
J-statistic (p-value) 0.144 0.146 0.130
Implied parameters:
β — 0.961 (11.42) —
θ — 0.810 (15.76) —
ρ — 0.217 (7.62) —
ν 0.706 (2.67)
Period: 1982:1-2006:3. No. of observations: 99. t-ratios in parentheses. The table contains
estimates of the Forward-looking (FNPCI) and Hybrid (HNPCI) NKPCs with immigration,
estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments. Instruments: a constant, four lags of the
inﬂation rate, the relative unemployment rate of immigrants, the log share of immigrants in
employment, the inﬂation rate of imported inputs, the labor income share, and two lags of
cyclical output and of an index of the degree of globalization of the Spanish economy. See
Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions. The implied parameters are estimated calibrating the
following values for the remaining parameters: α =0 .536, χ =0 .646,a n dφ1 =1(see
Appendix A.5).
5.1 Structural parameters and fundamental inﬂation
The estimation of equation (31) yields six estimated coeﬃcients (imposing α1+α2 =1 ),
w h i l ef r o m( 2 7 )w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gt e nf r e ep a r a m e t e r s :β, γ, α, χ, θ, λ, φ2, φ1, ρ,
and ν. To check how sensible our estimation is, we calibrate α, χ,a n dλ to their average
values in the Spanish economy, plus a range of plausible values of the (inverse) Frisch
labor supply elasticities of immigrants and native workers, φ2 and φ1.I nt h i sw a y ,w e
26are able to identify some of the underlying structural parameters: β, θ, ρ,a n dν (see
Appendix A.4 for details).22 We obtain a value for θ, the fraction of ﬁrms that keep
their prices unchanged per quarter, of 0.810, which is in line with the estimates of Galí
et al. (2003) for the Euro area (from 0.78 to 0.87) and of Galí and López-Salido (2001)
for Spain (from 0.84 to 0.91). Our quarterly estimate of θ implies that the average time
over which a price is ﬁxed, given by 1/(1 − θ), is 1.3 years. This is close to the survey
evidence about the price-setting behavior of Spanish ﬁrms at the end of our sample
period (2003-2004) reported in Fabiani et al. (2006), according to which the average
duration of unchanged prices in Spain is one year.
As for the remaining parameters, we obtain an elasticity of substitution between
native and immigrant workers of σ =1 .277 (ρ =0 .217), which implies that they are
gross substitutes but not too far from the Cobb-Douglas case (σ =1 ). Under the
plausible assumption that φ1 is unity, the implied estimate of the eﬀect of immigration
o nt h ew a g em a r k u pi sν ' 0.7, being rather robust to a wide range of larger values of
φ2, so that for each percentage point increase in immigration the wage markup decreases
by about 0.7 percentage points. We do not have any other empirical evidence in the
literature to check how sensible this ﬁnding is, though it agrees with the fact that the
growth of real wages has been slightly negative since the mid-1990s, as shown in Figure
7, when the Spanish economy entered a long expansion which still lasts today.
In order to check how the model explains the evolution of inﬂation, we estimate the
fundamental inﬂation rate as described in Section 4. To compute forecasts of a single
right-hand side variable determining inﬂa t i o nw eu s et h ec o e ﬃcients presented in column
(2) of Table 1. We then run a second-order vector autoregression of inﬂation changes
and the deviations of xt from its sample mean, and then apply equation (30), which is
integrated forward. As can be observed, the resulting fundamental inﬂation, shown in
Figure 8, tracks observed inﬂation surprisingly well.
22Notice that an estimate of the real wage sluggishness, γ, cannot be directly identiﬁed from (27).
However, an indirect estimate can be recovered from the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable,
ωt−1, when estimating by GMM the partial adjustment model for the real wage in (12), with four lags
of the regressors as instruments. This yields b Γ =0 .713 (t-ratio=12.56). Hence, using Γ =
γ
1−α+γα with
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Figure 8: Actual and fundamental inﬂation, 1981-2006
We now focus on the eight-year period since the beginning of 1999, when Spain joined
the Euro alongside ten other countries. Over this period inﬂation increased from 2.4%
in 1998:4 to 4.5% in 2001:1 and then steadily fell to 3.5% in 2006:4, while the unemploy-
ment rate fell by 7 percentage points (p.p.), which represents a very favorable tradeoﬀ
for the Spanish economy by historical standards. Over the same period, the relative
unemployment rate of immigrants rose by 3 p.p., the immigrant share in employment
increased by a massive 12 p.p., and the price of imported inputs rose in net by 0.4 p.p.,
with sharp variations up and down.
Over this period fundamental inﬂation overpredicts actual inﬂation by 0.4 p.p. annu-
ally. Thus, there is still some extra reason for the moderate behavior of inﬂation that we
have yet to account for. A natural candidate is the anchoring of inﬂation expectations
due to the operation of the single monetary policy in the euro area.23
23Indeed, recursive estimation of (27) indicates that from 2002 onwards the coeﬃcient on future
inﬂation has been smoothly rising whereas the coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation has gone down, without
violating the long-run neutrality restriction. However, we have not been able to identify a variable
28To compute their contribution to fundamental inﬂation, we shut out in turn the
unemployment rate, the three terms in the immigrant’s unemployment rate, and the im-
ported input inﬂation rate in the equation determining the fundamental inﬂation rate.
The results from this exercise are quite revealing. Rescaling by the average observed in-
ﬂation rate of 3.9% per year, we ﬁnd that without the contribution of the unemployment
rate, inﬂation would have been 2.5 p.p. lower annually, whereas without the compos-
ite contribution of the immigrant unemployment terms inﬂation would have been 2.2
p.p. higher on average every year. Thus, over this particular period, about 85% of the
increase in inﬂation derived from the reduction in the average unemployment rate was
compensated by the eﬀects of the increase of the unemployment rate of immigrants and
their share in employment. Conversely, the contribution of imported input prices to
inﬂation has been marginal relative to the eﬀect of immigration.
5.2 Robustness checks
As a robustness check, to account for variability of the price markup (so far assumed
constant) we also introduced cyclical output as an additional regressor in (27), but its
coeﬃcient was not signiﬁcant (with a t-ratio of 1.20). We also estimate the hybrid NKPC
in equation (28). The results are shown in Column (3) of Table 1. While the coeﬃcients
on the lead and lags of inﬂation are very close to adding up to 1, it turns out that the
coeﬃcient on πt−2 is positive. This coeﬃcient corresponds to −ς/(τ +βθ) in the model,
thereby implying that the fraction of ﬁrms following a rule of thumb, ς,i sn e g a t i v ea n d
therefore meaningless. Imposing the restriction on the sum of coeﬃcients does not solve
this problem either. Thus, we discard the HNPCI speciﬁcation in favour of the FNPCI
speciﬁcation.
Finally, it is worth comparing the performance of our proposed equation with the
open economy versions of the standard models of the NKPC popularized by Galí and
Gertler (1999). As mentioned above, these are the forward-looking (FNPC) and the hy-
brid (HNPC) equations in (25) and (26), where the real marginal cost is captured by the
(logged) aggregate labor income share, sL, and the relative price of imported materials
w h i c hh e l p st op i nd o w nt h e s ee ﬀects.
29and labor, that is: mc = sL + ξ(pm − w). As discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), the parameter ξ is zero when the production function is Cobb-Douglas whereas,
using instead a CES speciﬁcation, it is positive when the elasticity of substitution be-
tween labor and intermediate goods is above unity, as is often found in the literature.
These equations were applied by Galí and López-Salido (2001) to estimate the NKPC
for Spain over 1980-1998, yielding a good ﬁt and sensible estimates of the underlying
structural parameters that we also found with our dataset. Since their estimation period
ends before immigration surged, it is interesting to check how these models perform up
to the end of our sample period, 2006:3. Estimating by GMM with their instrument set
yields, for the FNPC:24
πt= 1.050 Etπt+1 — 0.037 sLt + 0.004 (pmt − wt)
(31.10) (3.31) (1.65) (32)
and for the HNPC:
πt= 0.410 Etπt+1 + 0.629 πt−1 + 0.010 sLt — 0.004 (pmt − wt)
(9.41) (17.12) (1.69) (4.23) (33)
where t-ratios are reported in parentheses. In both regressions, the implied value of
β is above unity, violating the restriction that both the coeﬃcient on Etπt+1 (i.e., β)
in (25) and the sum of the coeﬃcients on Etπt+1 and πt−1 (i.e., (βθ + ζ)/τ)i n( 2 6 )
should be smaller than 1. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcient on sLt is negative and
signiﬁcant in (31) and positive but nonsigniﬁcant in (32), while the coeﬃcient on the
relative price changes sign across the two speciﬁcations. These results turn out to be
robust to imposing a value of β in a plausible range between, say, 0.90 and 1.F o r
example, for β =0 .99, we get, for the FNPC:
πt= 0.99 Etπt+1 — 0.029 sLt + 0.007 (pmt − wt)
(−)( 2 .92) (5.88) (34)
and for the HNPC:
πt= 0.358 Etπt+1 + 0.639 πt−1 + 0.004 sLt — 0.002 (pmt − wt)
(9.98) (9.98) (0.76) (2.40) (35)
24The instruments set includes a constant plus four lags of price and wage inﬂation, relative prices,
detrended output, and the labor share.
30Therefore, applying the standard models of the NKPC —which ignore diﬀerences
between the preferences of immigrants and native workers— does not work once the
sample is extended to include the immigration boom in the Spanish labor market, which
provides some further support to our approach.
6 Industry-speciﬁcN K P C s
Since the previous results for the aggregate economy seem to conﬁrm the moderating
eﬀect of immigration on inﬂation, our reasoning would be reinforced if, when estimat-
ing NKPCs at the industry level, this eﬀect was larger for those industries with higher
intensity of immigrant labor. Using information from the Spanish Labor Force Sur-
vey (EPA), we are able to obtain a breakdown of employment by nationality for three
large industries: manufacturing, construction, and services.25 This, together with the
i n f o r m a t i o no ni n d u s t r yp r i c ed e ﬂators and GDP from the Spanish National Accounts,
allows us to compute industry inﬂation measures, plus industry labor shares and cycli-
cal output, to be used as instrumental variables. Since industry unemployment is not
aw e l l - d e ﬁned concept, we use aggregate measures of ut and u2t − ut in the industry
speciﬁcation of equation (27). Nevertheless, to the extent that there is labor mobility
across industries, these aggregate measures of unemployment are bound to capture some
of their traditional disciplinary eﬀects on inﬂation. Furthermore, u2t is interacted with
the immigration rate, irt, measured for each of the industries, and st is computed at the
industry level.
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the (restricted) FNPCI in these three
industries, where we have imposed the value of the discount factor estimated before, i.e.
β =0 .961, which is not statistically rejected in the unrestricted estimation. Interestingly,
the eﬀect of the relative unemployment rate and the interaction terms is much larger
and signiﬁcant in the services industry, where 62% of the migrants work (specially in
home services, and hotels and catering), than in construction and manufacturing, where
19% and 12% of immigrants work, respectively (over 2000-2006, where the immigrant
25We exclude agriculture because price-setting in this sector is highly aﬀected by subsidies and supply
shocks, and so our model does not describe it well.
31stock starts to be signiﬁcant). Therefore, this fragmentary evidence seems to go in the
same direction as our previous results.
Table 2. Industry-Speciﬁc Forward-Looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve for Spain
Dependent variable: Industry inﬂation rate
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing Construction Services
Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio Coeﬀ. t-ratio
Unemployment rate -0.061 (2.18) -0.102 (2.52) -0.093 (2.08)
Rel. immigrant unemployment r. -0.024 (1.03) -0.042 (1.21) -0.061 (2.32)
Immigrant unemployment rate× 0.019 (0.61) -0.017 (1.49) -0.033 (2.36)
Immigration rate
Immigrant unemployment rate× 0.003 (1.10) 0.002 (0.96) -0.006 (1.82)
Immigration rate squared
∆Real imported input prices 0.005 (2.76) 0.011 (1.86) 0.008 (2.16)
J-statistic (p-value) 0.130 0.140 0.150
Period: 1982:1-2006:3. No. of observations: 99. t-ratios in parentheses.The table contains
estimates of the Forward-Looking NKPC with immigration (FNPCI), estimated by the Gen-
eralized Method of Moments. Instruments: a constant, four lags of the inﬂation rate, the
relative unemployment rate of immigrants, the log share of immigrants in employment, the
inﬂation rate of imported inputs, the labor income share, and two lags of cyclical output and
of an index of the degree of globalization of the Spanish economy. See Appendix B for variable
deﬁnitions. The coeﬃcients on future and lagged inﬂation rates are imposed to be 0.49 and
0.51, respectively, so that β =0 .961, as found in Table 1.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper examines the evolution of the Phillips curve for the Spanish economy since the
early 1980s. In particular, we focus on what has happened since the late 1990s. Starting
from 1999 the unemployment rate fell by almost 7 percentage points, while inﬂation
remained relatively subdued around a plateau of 2%-4%. Thus, the slope of the PC has
become much ﬂatter. We argue that this favorable evolution is largely due to the impact
of the huge rise in the immigration rate, from 1% of the population in 1995 to 9.3% in
2006, on the labor market. We derive a New Keynesian Phillips curve accounting for the
eﬀects of immigration, a variable which is found to shift the curve if preferences towards
32labor supply or the bargaining power of immigrants and natives diﬀer. In particular,
we ﬁnd that the relative unemployment rate of immigrants with respect to the national
unemployment rate and the interaction of the immigrant unemployment rate with their
share in employment, in levels and squared, enters the PC, so that both its intercept
and slope is shifted by the presence of immigration.
By estimating our NKPC model with quarterly data for Spain over the period 1982-
2006, we are able to conﬁrm that the variables in which the immigrant unemployment
rate enters are signiﬁcant determinants of the PC and that conventional models of the
NKPC which treat labor as an homogeneous input do not ﬁtt h ed a t aw e l l . W ea l s o
ﬁnd that while the fall in the average unemployment rate over the last 8 years caused
the inﬂation rate to increase by 2.5 percentage points per year, the surge in immigra-
tion accounts for an oﬀsetting 2.2 percentage-point drop in the inﬂation rate per year.
Finally, we also estimate industry-speciﬁcP C s ,ﬁnding that the impact of the relative
immigrant unemployment rate is larger for the industries with a higher share of immi-
grant employment. These eﬀects may decay over time, as immigrants integrate and their
labor supply behavior becomes closer to that of natives, but it is too soon to detect such
evolution in the case of Spain.
In this respect, the eﬀect of immigration on inﬂation is good news for central banks.
Yet, as Bean (2006) argues, the ﬂattening of the PC is rather more of a mixed blessing
since, on the one hand, it implies that demand shocks and policy mistakes will not show
up in large movements of inﬂation but, on the other, if inﬂation remains above target,
ad e e p e rs l o w d o w no ri n c r e a s i n gi m m i g r a t i o nﬂows will be needed to bring it down.
33A Appendix A. Some derivations
A.1 Derivation of λ
Consider the following approximation of the (log) deviation of a variable X from its





' (X −X)/X,s ot h a tX = X exp(b x) ' X(1+ b x),a n df o ra n yp o w e ra of X,
Xa = X
a
exp(b x) ' X(1 + ab x). Then, since aggregate employment is given by (2), use
of the previous approximation yields
N
ρ
(1 + ρb n)=δ1N1
ρ
(1 + ρb n1)+δ2N2
ρ
(1 + ρb n2).






and δ1+δ2 =1 , it is straightforward to show
that
b n − b n2 = λn(b n1 − b n2),
























Using the same steps as before, we obtain the following expression for the (log) deviations
of real wages from steady state,
b ω − b ω2 = λω(b ω1 − b ω2),







Finally, taking the marginal products in (1) with respect to N and N1 in steady state




































,w h e r eIR= N2/N.
A.2 Second-order approximation to λ(IR)
Let us now reinterpret the functional form of λ(IR) derived above as the log-linearized
approximation of the CES aggregator in (2) around any given value of IR, not necessarily
its steady-state value. This would yield
λ(IR)=1− δ2 (IR)
ρ ,
34where IR = N2/N. Using of a second-order Taylor expansion of (IR)
ρ around ρ =0 ,
i.e., the Cobb-Douglas case, we get
(IR)





where ir = n2 − n =l n ( N2/N) and function q(ir)=ρi r+
ρ2
2 ir2.N o t i c e t h a t ,
around ρ =0 , we can interpret the distributional parameters δ1 and δ2 in (2) as the




2 would yield the aggregation rules in (5) in exact terms. Hence, replacing
the approximation into the function λ(IR),i m p l i e st h a t
λ(IR) ' λ =1− (1 − λ)[1 + q(ir)] = λ − (1 − λ)q(ir),
so that 1 − λ becomes
1 − λ =( 1− λ)[1 + q(ir)].
Let us now examine the two terms in (27) where 1 − λ appears:
(i) φ21(u2 − u):
φ21(u2 − u)=( 1 − λ)(φ2 − φ1)(u2 − u)=( 1− λ)[1 + q(ir)](φ2 − φ1)(u2 − u)=
= φ21(u2 − u)+φ21(u2 − u) q(ir),
where φ21 =( 1− λ)(φ2 − φ1) > 0.
(ii) ψu:
ψu =[ λφ1 +( 1− λ)φ2]u = φ1u +( 1− λ)(φ2 − φ1)u =
= φ1u +( 1− λ)[1 + q(ir)](φ2 − φ1)u =( φ1 + φ21)u + φ21uq (ir).
Finally, the sum of both terms yields:
φ21(u2 − u)+ψu = φ21(u2 − u)+( φ1 + φ21)u + φ21u2 q(ir).
Thus, the above combination in terms of time-varying parameters, can be written in
terms of constant parameters as long as two interaction terms, involving u2 ir and u2 ir2,
a r ea d d e dt oe q u a t i o n( 2 7 ) .
A.3 Determinants of the wage markup
To interpret the inﬂuence of migration on the (deviations of the) wage markup, e µ
w,
it is useful to consider the right-to-manage of wage setting model, where unions and
ﬁrms bargain over the wage rate but the ﬁrm is free to choose the level of employment
unilaterally (see Layard et al.,1 9 9 1 ) .A si ss t a n d a r di nt h i sm o d e l ,u n i o n sm a x i m i z et h e
following objective function
max
ω Ω = ωN(ω)+ς[UM − N(w)]ω
a,
35where N(ω) denotes labor demand (with N0(ω) < 0), UM the number of union mem-
bers, and ωa the alternative wage, such that the relative inﬂuence of non-employed





which is the wage-setting curve. Exogenous shifts in labor supply (L)i n ﬂuences the









That is, a non-employed worker has a chance to ﬁnd a job and earn ω or remain non-
employed and get an unemployment beneﬁtw h i c hi saf r a c t i o nb of the wage. Replacing
this expression into the wage-setting curve gives
N




which is upward sloping in the ω − L space if N00(ω)ω + N0(ω) < 0, a condition that is
satisﬁed by linear and concave labor demand functions. The equilibrium values of ω and
N (ω∗ and N∗) are determined by equating the above upward-sloping wage-setting curve
and the downward-sloping labor demand function N0(ω), where unemployment is given
by L − N∗(ω∗). An increase in labor supply gives rise to rightward shifts of both the
wage-setting curve and the labor supply curve, inducing an unambiguous fall in wages
a n da na m b i g u o u se ﬀect on unemployment. To the extent that wages are determined in
a non-competitive way in this model, we loosely interpret this reduction in wages as a
fall in the wage markup.
We assume that the labor supply shift is either captured by the diﬀerential in the
(logged) labor forces,  2 −  , or by the gap in the unemployment rates, u2 − u,s i n c e
migrants often enter unemployment when they arrive. Since  2 −   had a positive and
insigniﬁcant estimated coeﬃcient when introduced in the NKPC, we allow u2 − u to
have an extra eﬀect on inﬂation via variations in e µ
w, on top of its direct eﬀect on the
marginal cost.
A.4 Long-run neutrality in the NKPC
As shown by Batini et al. (2005), an isomorphic derivation of the NKPC popularized
by Galí and Gertler (1999) stems from the quadratic price adjustment model proposed
by Rotemberg (1982), rather than Calvo’s (1983) model of constant probability of price
changes. This alternative derivation has the advantage of allowing the probability of
each ﬁrm resetting its prices to depend on the general level of inﬂation, since the costs
of not doing so most certainly rise with this general level (see Ball et al., 1988).






















where the optimal price is p∗
t+s = µp + mcn
t+s,w i t hmcn being the nominal marginal
cost, πa denotes the general level of inﬂation (taken as given by the ﬁrm), and b>0
and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 are parameters in the loss function. When c =1 , price adjustment
costs fully depend on the deviations from the general level of inﬂation . Notice that
the quadratic adjustment cost term in price changes implies that the higher is πa
t+s−1
t h em o r eb e n e ﬁcial is for ﬁrms to reset prices more frequently. The Euler equation (in
period t) of the above minimization yields
βbEtpt+1 − (1 − b(1 + β))pt + bpt−1 = −b pt,
where







The standard solution to this Euler equation is
pt = µ1pt−1 +( 1− µ1)(1 − βµ1)
b pt
1 − βµ1L−1,
where L−1 is the forward operator (e.g. L−sxt = Etxt+s)a n dµ1 is the unique stable
root of βbµ2 − [1 − b(1 + β)]µ + b =0 .I fw en o ws u b t r a c tf r o mt h ep r e v i o u ss o l u t i o n
the following identity




we obtain a new solution in terms of ﬁrm’s price inﬂation, πt (= pt − pt−1)
πt =( 1− µ1)(1 − βµ1)
mc + pt + cbπa
t−1 − βcbπa
t




where use has been made of mcn
t = mct + pt. Then, since in equilibrium all ﬁrms are








(1 − µ1)(1 − βµ1)
µ1(1 + βc)
mct.
If 0 <c<1, this NKPC corresponds to the hybrid case of Galí and Gertler (1999)
where we ﬁnd that in the long-run steady state, πt = Etπt+1 = πt−1, there is a non-zero
relationship between inﬂation and the real marginal cost, i.e., π =
(1−µ1)(1−βµ1)
µ1(1−β)(1−c) mc.
If c =0 , the NKPC is equivalent to the forward-looking case of Galí and Gertler
(1999), such that
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1 − µ1)(1 − βµ1)
µ1
mct,
37where again, there is a long-run tradeoﬀ given by π =
(1−µ1)(1−βµ1)
µ1(1−β) mc.








(1 − µ1)(1 − βµ1)
µ1(1 + β)
mct,
so that inﬂation is independent of the real marginal cost in the long run, although it
inﬂuences the change in inﬂation, i.e., ∆π =
(1−µ1)(1−βµ1)
µ1(1−β) mc.
As discussed in Section 4.5, an alternative way of obtaining long-run neutrality in
the NKPC is to assume real wage sluggishness.
A.5 Calibration of the parameters
As mentioned in the main text, the estimation of equation (31) yields 6 estimated co-
eﬃcients (imposing that α1 + α2 =1 ), while from (27) we have the following 10 free
parameters: β, γ, α, χ, θ, λ, φ2, φ1, ν,a n dρ. Thus, we can only attempt to identify
a subset of the structural parameters. As shown below, through calibration of α, χ, λ,
and the (average) labor supply elasticity of natives, φ1, we are able to identify β, θ, ρ,
and ν.T h ei d e n t i ﬁcation procedure for each of these structural parameters involves the
values of the restricted coeﬃcients reported in Table 1 (Column 2) and, in each case, it
can be summarized as follows:
(i) β, from the estimated coeﬃcient on Etπ+1, b ψ
f
1,w h i c hi se q u a lt o0.490 (t-




1+β, the delta method yields b β =0 .961 (t-ratio=
11.42).
(ii) θ,f r o mt h ee s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcient of ∆st which is
α(1−χ)κf
(1+β) =0 .005 (t-ratio=2.77),
with κf =
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ , using calibrated values for α and χ, and the estimated value of β
obtained in (i). It is easy to check that this yields a quadratic function in θ.I fw et a k e
α =0 .536 and χ =0 .646 —computed as the average shares of imported intermediate
inputs in gross output (α) and in gross output net of capital compensation (χ)i nt h e
Spanish economy over the period 1980-2003 according to the EU KLEMS database
(www.euklems.net)— plus b β =0 .961,t h i sy i e l d sb θ =0 .810 (t-ratio=15.76), whereas the
other root in the quadratic function is larger than unity. For this value of θ,w ea l s og e t
b κf =0 .0517 (t-ratio=4.07).
(iii) ρ, from the ratio between the estimated coeﬃcients on the interaction terms
u2ir2 and u2ir.I ne ﬀect, from (27), this ratio yields b ρ =2 0.0033
0.0307 =0 .217 (t-ratio=7.62).
Hence, the estimated elasticity of substitution in (2) is given by b σ = 1
1−0.217 =1 .277
(t-ratio=35.47).
























PQ,s ot h a t
(N1
N2)ρ−1 = W1
W2, where respective markup terms would multiply the wage terms under





0.03 =3 2 .33,




W2.N o w ,t oo b t a i nav a l u ef o rδ1we
need to assume some value for the relative wage (or relative wage plus markup). Let us
take three alternatives: (a) W1/W2 =1⇒ δ1 =0 .938,( b )W1/W2 =1 .3 ⇒ δ1 =0 .952,
and (c) W1/W2 =1 .5 ⇒ δ1 =0 .958. Thus, since λ = δ1(
N1
N )ρ = δ1 (0.97)
0.217,w eh a v e :
(a) λ =0 .932,( b )λ =0 .946,a n d( c )λ =0 .952.
We also need to make some assumption regarding the (inverse) Frisch labor supply
elasticities. If we take a value of 1 for native workers, so that φ1 =1 , as is assumed in
most of the literature on NKPCs (see, e.g., Galí et al., 2001, and BG), and a value of
φ2 =2 ,f r o mt h ea b o v er a t i o ,
ψ
φ21+ν =1 .4, we get: (a) b ν =0 .695,( b )b ν =0 .698,a n d
(c) b ν =0 .701. Alternatively, if we assume use φ2 =4 , we obtain: (a) b ν =0 .658,( b )
b ν =0 .668,a n d( c )b ν =0 .672. Thus the value given in the text, b ν ' 0.7, is quite robust.
39B Appendix B. Variable deﬁnitions and sources
Nominal and Real GDP. GDP from Spanish National Accounts produced by Instituto
Nacional de Estadística (INE, www.ine.es) Base 1995, linked forward to Base 2000 at
1995:1 using growth rates. Data are seasonally adjusted and adjusted for calendar eﬀects
by INE.
Inﬂation. Change in GDP deﬂator from Spanish National Accounts by INE. Computed
as quarterly change in nominal GDP minus quarterly change in real GDP.
Employment and unemployment for immigrants and natives. From the Spanish Labor
Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa) by INE, linking 1976, 1987, 2001, and 2005
deﬁnitions. Data correspond to full-time equivalent jobs. Seasonally adjusted by INE.
W o r k e r sw i t hd o u b l en a t i o n a l i t ya r ec o n s i d e r e da si m m i g r a n t st h r o u g h o u tt h es a m p l e .
There is no data on immigrants before 1987:2, so we assume that they have the same
unemployment rate as natives through that quarter. Seasonally adjusted using Program
TSW.
Imported input prices. Price index for imported intermediate inputs from Ministerio de
Economía y Hacienda, SERSIE Database (www.meh.es).
Labor share. Remuneration of employees multiplied by the ratio of employment to
employees and divided by nominal GDP. This entails assuming that the self-employed
earn the same labor income as employees.
Nominal wage. Remuneration of employees divided by the number of employees. The
latter is constructed following the same procedure as for total employment.
Degree of openness. Real imports plus exports divided by real GDP from INE. Same
procedures as for real GDP.
Index of globalization. This index measures economic globalization, including both ac-
tual ﬂows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and income payments
to foreigners) and restrictions (hidden import barriers, mean tariﬀ rate, taxes on inter-
national trade, and capital account restrictions). Source: Swiss Institute for Business
Cycle Research (globalization.kof.ethz.ch), see Dreher (2006).
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